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This survey of industrial policies in Latin American and the Caribbean makes two basic claims,
namely: 1) that the late 1980s and the entire decade of the 1990s represented a transition from
the industrial policies of the import substitution model to industrial policies suitable for open
national economies in a more integrated world economy; and 2) that this transition period has not
concluded and, consequently, it is premature to pass judgment on the effectiveness of the still-
emerging set of policies.
Before proceeding to the description of the prevailing industrial policies, it is necessary to
clarify the basic concepts that will be utilized.  First, industrial policy is defined as any decision
by the public authorities of a national economy that systematically affects the vector of goods
and services produced in that economy.  Second, a distinction can be made between explicit and
implicit industrial polices.  The former are decisions by the authorities that aim, in a clearly
expressed manner, at stimulating the allocation of productive resources to particular sectors
while discouraging investment and production in other sectors and either neglecting or intending
to be neutral on still other sectors.  The latter are, in principle, all other policies, to the extent
that, at least in principle, they have measurable and relevant effects on the vector of goods and
services produced by the economy, favorably affecting some sectors and hurting others, even if
those consequences are not part of their stated purpose.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section documents a turning point in
industrial policies in the Latin American and Caribbean countries during the mid-1990s
2 and
attempts to characterize the emerging trend in business promotion policies in the region. An
empirical survey of industrial policies follows.  It is a qualitative survey in that it is limited to
identifying and describing the types of policy rules, policy measures, (and, in some cases, the
institutions) through which governments in the region have sought either to adapt to, or to take
advantage of, the worldwide trend towards open and competitive markets.
3  As suggested above,
no attempt is made to measure these policies’ impact quantitatively.  However, as a contribution
                                                          
1 The author is an economist at Regional Department 3 of the Inter-American Development Bank.  He would like to
thank Eduardo Lora, Alberto Chong, and Ernesto Stein for their comments.  The views expressed in this document
are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Inter-American Development Bank.
2 This claim takes as its point of departure Peres’ (1997) analysis of what he calls the resurgence of industrial
policies in Latin America and the Caribbean.
3 The survey is based on primary sources in that most of the information was gathered from the web sites of the
governmental institutions in charge of industrial policies in the region.4
to a qualitative judgment of the emerging policy approaches, the paper closes with a brief review
of Latin American businessmen’s and other experts’ opinions on one important subset of these
policies, export promotion policies.
4    
2. The Origin and Nature of the Emerging Policies
2.1 The 1990s: A Turning Point for Industrial Policies in Latin America and the
Caribbean
The first round of comprehensive structural reforms undertaken in the 1980s was largely
completed in the early 1990s. The key components of this reform effort, trade liberalization,
privatization, and domestic market liberalization and deregulation, represented major industrial
policy decisions of the implicit type, which inevitably reshaped the vector of goods and services
produced by the national economies.  In fact, they brought about profound changes in the
productive structure of the region’s economy.  For instance, Peres’ claims
5 there were five
important changes in the productive structure of Latin America’s manufacturing sector in the
1990s: 1) strong growth of capital-intensive, raw material-processing industries such as steel,
petrochemical products, and cellulose; 2) a boom in the type of assembly industries epitomized
by the Mexican maquiladoras; 3) a renewed leadership of the automotive industry in the three
biggest countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), in spite of a generalized retrogression of the
metal-mechanic sector; 4) scant development of high-technology sectors such as electronics,
semiconductors, computers and informatics; and 5) a loss of relative weight for traditional labor-
intensive industries such as textiles, apparel, and footwear.  If this is an accurate description of
what happened, it seems plausible that, while the second and third trends may have much to do
with deliberate, explicit industrial policies,
6 the other three are, for the most part, the outcome of
the implicit industrial policies embedded in the liberalizing thrust of the structural reforms.
As stated in the introduction, the 1990s were a decade of transition in explicit industrial
policies. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the generalized adoption of market-oriented reforms
                                                          
4 Businessmen’s opinions are based on a set of surveys conducted in the late 1990s in four Latin American countries
in the context of the Regional Project on Policies to Promote Innovation and Competitiveness carried out by the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  The results are discussed in Macario et al.
(2000).  Experts’ opinions are based on a few relevant pieces of the secondary literature available on this issue.
5 See Peres (1997).
6 In fact, the hypothesis that the renewed leadership of the automotive industry in the major countries of Latin
America is attributable to industrial policies of the explicit variety is supported by the empirical studies of Bonelli5
and reduction in state intervention in the economy prompted Latin American policymakers to
abandon import-substitution industrial policies such as tariff protection and subsidies.  Due to the
understandable tendency for processes of radical change to overshoot the mark, however, the
dominant impulse in the late 1980s and early 1990s was to scrap every type of explicit industrial
policy.
7  Underlying this policy shift was the assumption that market forces would spontaneously
lead to an optimal reallocation of resources.
Nonetheless, by the mid-1990s there was a noticeable change in the policy atmosphere.
In both the public and the private sector there was a growing feeling that the reforms were not
delivering the promised results.  Moreover, the strains, imbalances, and difficulties of the
industrial restructuring process and the unintended, undesirable outcomes of the reforms created
conditions favorable to the emergence of explicit industrial policies congruent with the new,
market-oriented, development strategy adopted by most countries in the region.
The ensuing turn in the direction of industrial policies has several remarkable features.
First, the adoption of the new industrial policies was almost simultaneous in a significant number
of countries and can roughly be dated to the three-year period 1994-1996.  Second, in most
leading countries this took the form of explicit, medium-to-long-term plans, programs, and/or
strategies for the industrial sector.  Third, the policy turn was generally the outcome of (or, at the
very least, was broadly related to) a public debate about the effects of the structural reforms and
the need to improve the domestic industry’s competitiveness in the new context of a more open
national economy.
This policy shift took several forms. In Colombia, a study on the determinants of the
country’s competitiveness
8 was published in 1994 in the midst of a national debate on the impact
of trade liberalization and real exchange rate appreciation.  According to Martínez Ortiz (1997),
the study’s publication shifted the national discussion towards competitiveness and contributed
                                                                                                                                                                                          
(1997), and da Motta Veiga and Bonelli (1998), for the case of Brazil; Kosacoff et al. (1998), for the case of
Argentina; and Hernández Laos and ten Kate (1998) for the case of Mexico.
7 This does not, of course, mean that all industrial policy rules and institutions of the old type were actually
discontinued. Some survived, and it is fair to say that at no point were they completely overhauled. Mexico, for
instance, began to undertake external and internal liberalization in 1984, in the aftermath of the country’s debt crisis.
The National Program for Industrial and External Trade Promotion nonetheless included, along with policy
measures in keeping with the reforms’ liberalizing thrust, policies to promote particular sectors such as autos,
pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, and computers.  In Argentina, even at the height of the structural reform process
under Minister Cavallo’s first tenure, a special regime for the automotive industry was maintained which, according
to Sirlin (1999), included “heavy protection through import quotas.”
8 See Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (1994).6
to create a common language between policymakers in the public sector and entrepreneurs in the
private sector.  During the 1994 presidential campaign, an influential group of entrepreneurs
pressed for the adoption as government policy of the study’s main conclusions. After one month
of being installed, the new government created the National Competitiveness Council, which, in
turn, formulated, in 1995, a National Competitiveness Strategy.
9
While the Colombian government was creating the National Competitiveness Council,
the Costa Rican government approved the Strategy for the Industrial Modernization of Costa
Rica.  The Strategy’s main goal
10 was “to foster and support the industrial modernization of the
small- and medium-size enterprises to enable them to acquire and maintain a dynamic
competitive advantage.”  In 1995 the government created the National Competitiveness Council
and charged it with coordinating actions to promote sustained export and productivity growth.
Also in 1994, the government of Jamaica published a “green paper” titled “Towards a
National Industrial Policy.”  According to van Riel (1997), this document sparked a national
debate in which government, the private sector, academia, and international financial institutions
all participated.  The debate culminated in the adoption, in 1996, of the National Industrial Policy
proposed in the green paper.
11  The strategy is based on export promotion in sectors selected
according to their competitive advantage.
In 1995, the Cardoso government in Brazil issued a policy document entitled “Industrial,
Technological, and External Trade Policy.”  The policy statement identifies as the main goal the
consolidation of a new pattern of expansion for Brazilian industry.  A major objective is to create
the conditions that will enable Brazilian firms to make the transition from the defensive
strategies dominant in the initial phase of trade liberalization to more assertive strategies based
on increased productivity and technological innovation.
In Mexico, the turning point was the launching of the Industrial Policy and External
Trade Program (PROPICE in its Spanish acronym) by the Zedillo administration in 1996, in the
aftermath of the severe economic and political crisis of 1995.  The Program is based on a
diagnosis according to which the fundamental challenges the Mexican economy faced were: 1)
the need to shift the emphasis from being competitive in the markets for labor-intensive goods to
being competitive in the markets for advanced-technology goods and services; 2) the need to
                                                          
9 For this strategy, see Presidencia de la República de Colombia (1995).
10 See Labarca and Peres (1997).
11 See Government of Jamaica (1996).7
continue attracting foreign direct investment; 3) the need to rebuild production chains that were
dislocated as a consequence of trade liberalization; 4) the need to overcome the obstacles faced
by small-, medium-size and micro-enterprises in the areas of technology and management; and
5) the need to decentralize the manufacturing industry.
In contrast to the other cases, in Argentina the government did not produce a systematic
policy or strategy document formalizing, as it were, the policy shift.  But a policy shift occurred
nonetheless.  Kosacoff et al. (1998) point out that in the two-year period 1994-1995, numerous
measures affecting industrial development were implemented, including changes in trade policy
(e.g., import quotas and specific tariffs), and changes in specific policies regulating the
automotive sector.
From these countries’ experiences it can be concluded that towards in the mid-1990s
there was a general tendency in Latin American and the Caribbean to revisit the issue of explicit
industrial policies.  This led to a reformulation from which a new set of policies started to
emerge.
2.2 Towards a Characterization of the Emerging Policies
In order to understand the emerging policies it is as important to characterize them negatively
(i.e., for what they are not, for what they do not propose) as it is to characterize them positively
(i.e., for what they are).  First, it must be pointed out that the emerging policies do not seek to
return to the import substitution model.  Nor do these policies aim at interfering with the market
mechanism through a systematic and generalized use of arbitrary subsidies.  In contrast to many
policymakers of the import substitution era, their proponents do not overlook the importance of
macroeconomic stability and sound macroeconomic policies. On the contrary, macroeconomic
stability is explicitly and even forcefully prescribed as a prerequisite for investment growth and
industrial modernization.
In positive terms, the defining feature of the new industrial policies is that they aim to
improve the competitiveness of domestic producers in a new, increasingly integrated and open
world economy.  Instead of being designed to circumvent market outcomes, they seek to redress
market failures through the provision of public goods and government intervention to stimulate
the supply of goods with positive externalities.8
In this vein, it is instructive briefly to examine three explicit policy statements—in Brazil,
Colombia, and Mexico—where the new trends seem to take a more definite shape.
12  These
statements are institutionally significant in that they are an integral part of the national
development plans the governments are legally (and, in the case of Brazil, even constitutionally)
compelled to formulate and submit to their legislatures as the basic documents guiding
government action and the allocation of budgetary resources during a given presidential period.
The Colombian policy statement is particularly illustrative in that it makes explicit the
assumptions underlying its proposals. The Colombian authorities define their strategy toward the
productive sectors as an “ambitious competitiveness strategy for internationalization [of the
Colombian economy] that ought to be the outcome of a concerted effort by the public and private
sectors aimed at outlining joint technological, productive, trade, and infrastructure strategies that
shall make it possible to increase and efficiently utilize productive resources and generate
sustainable comparative advantages.”  The document further states a view of competitiveness as
a particular society’s ability to face the challenges posed by the global economy while at the
same time increasing its welfare.
This approach is based on four points: 1) in the modern world, competitive advantages
are, to a large extent, created—that is to say, emerge from factors that are themselves the result
of the development process and hence can be shaped by the economic agents (both private and
public), and not simply from the availability of natural resources or unskilled labor; 2) the effort
to create a more competitive economy must be approached in an integrated manner because
competitiveness is not merely the product of the enterprises’ individual actions but also the result
of the sector and global settings which provide a framework for those actions; 3) the efforts to
promote competition and overcome the constraints to free factor mobility must be completed
with active sector policies aimed at surmounting the obstacles to higher productivity levels; that,
consequently, sector policies and actions are needed to enable the different productive sectors
better to get integrated into the new development model; and that this must be done through
“strategic plans directed to remove institutional or regulatory restraints; redefine the scope of
credit policies, or export promotion policies, in term of sector-level objectives; design strategies
of industrial re-conversion; induce processes of technological transfer and innovation; and
                                                          
12 See Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestao do Brasil (1995), Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento
Industrial de México (1995) and Departamento Nacional de Planeación de Colombia (1994) and RedeGoverno
(2001).9
generate a greater integration of production chains so as to increase productivity”; and 4)
implementation of this vision requires a special effort to combine public and private actions on
the basis of dialogue and negotiation.
The document then proceeds to state that, in the circumstances then faced by the
Colombian economy, the competitiveness strategy took concrete shape in five programs: 1) the
national science and technology policy; 2) the strategic export plan; 3) the agricultural and rural
modernization policy; 4) the industrial modernization policy; and 5) the “infrastructure-for-
competitiveness” strategy.  The document also acknowledged that this set of policies was
permeated by a strategy towards human capital development.
Several themes in the Colombian policy statement are echoed in the 1995-2000 Mexican
Industrial and External Trade Policy Program (PICE in its Spanish acronym).
13  The program’s
point of departure was the general consideration that, while trade liberalization sowed the seeds
of competitiveness in the Mexican economy, major modernization challenges remained, such as
the need to overcome the limitations faced by the micro-, small-, and -medium enterprises; to re-
articulate a number of production chains; and foster regional development.  The program went
on to contend that, in order both to face these challenges and take advantage of the opportunities
opened up by trade liberalization, the Mexican government must “adopt an industrial policy
willing to acknowledge its own fundamental role.”  Employing a formulation closely resembling
that of the Colombian policy statement, Mexico’s PICE maintains “competitiveness does not
simply depend on availability of a limited number of cheap productive factors, nor can it be the
outcome of the isolated effort of firms or industries either, or simply of the action of market
forces.  Individual efforts to reach competitiveness must be complemented with the organization
and coordination of state action.”
Building on those premises, PICE’s policy statement unambiguously declared that the
central objective of Mexico’s industrial policy was to promote competitiveness in the domestic
manufacturing sector. This industrial policy would be implemented along three major strategic
lines, namely: 1) creating conditions for permanent and high profitability in the export sector; 2)
creating mechanisms to accelerate the development of highly competitive industrial clusters,
both at the regional and at the sector level, and integrating into them micro- small- and medium-
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size enterprises; and 3) promoting domestic market development and efficient import
substitution.
14
The Brazilian Multi-Annual Plan 1996-1999 begins by pointing out three main obstacles
(as of late 1995) to further modernization:
15 inflation, backwardness (of the state, firms, and
society), and the “corporate spirit.”
16  The document then went on to propose three basic
strategies for the period 1996-1999: 1) construction of a modern and efficient state; 2) reduction
of regional and social disequilibria; and 3) competitive insertion into the world economy and
productive modernization. The latter strategy, the most relevant for the present purpose, includes
the following guidelines: 1) modernization and expansion of infrastructure; 2) greater private
sector participation in total investment; 3) strengthening of productive sectors having the
potential for international insertion, and incentives to technological innovation and productive
restructuring; 4) improvement of education (with emphasis on basic education); and 5)
modernization of labor-market relations.
The Brazilian Multi-Annual Plan additionally tackled industrial and external trade policy,
first stating “it is necessary to overcome the economic, technological, and institutional
inefficiencies derived from the distortions of the preceding industrialization model, characterized
by excessive protection to domestic production and restrictions to the workings of the market.”
The plan also pointed out that Brazilian industrial and external trade policy must make
productive restructuring its main goal; the plan particularly stressed the need for efficiency and
competitiveness.
17
                                                          
14 These strategic lines were to be implemented through eight policies: i) macroeconomic stability and financial
development; ii) expansion of physical infrastructure and creation of the human and institutional base needed for a
complex, modern industry; iii) strengthening the integration of production chains; iv) improvement of the
“technological infrastructure”, including technological modernization and quality promotion; v) economic
deregulation; vi) export promotion; vii) a policy of international trade negotiations capable of opening up new
markets; and viii) promotion of competition.
15 See Ministério de Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestao do Brasil (1995).
16 Corporate spirit is the translation for the Portuguese (and Spanish) word corporativismo.  To avoid any
misunderstanding, it must be pointed out that in the broad Latin cultural tradition (i.e., the common thread that
arguably unifies the cultures of the Latin countries of Europe and the Latin countries of the Americas),
corporativismo is defined as the social attitude bent on seeking the satisfaction of narrow, particular interests.  It
roughly corresponds to the meaning conveyed by the expression “special interests” in the North American cultural
tradition.
17 In accordance with these criteria, the Multi-Annual Plan’s industrial policy defined the main policy actions to be
carried out in the 1996-1999 period as follows: i) reduction of the so-called “Brazil-cost,” that is to say, the extra
labor and fiscal costs producers (both foreign and domestic) have to bear when producing in Brazil as opposed to
producing in foreign countries; ii) improving the instruments for defending Brazilian producers from predatory
practices, unfair competition, and protectionist practices in the international market and fostering domestic
competition; iii) reducing the financial costs of investment; iii) improving the existing export credit insurance11
A second noteworthy Brazilian policy document is the 2000-2001 Government Agenda
statement.
18  The document’s industrial policy section reiterates the Multi-Annual Plan’s
statement, declaring “the central objective of development policies is to insert the Brazilian
economy into the world economy in a competitive manner.”  Showing a continuity from the last
decade in policy formulation, the agenda subsequently proposes intermediate, operational
objectives very much along the lines of the Multi-Annual Plan.  A remarkable new element,
though, is worth highlighting.  The list of policy guidelines and actions begins with a warning
and a call to action. The warning is that the growth of Internet-based technologies entails the risk
of bringing about a new form of economic exclusion, the digital exclusion both of less developed
societies and of the poor in all societies.  The call is, consequently, to strive to make Brazil an
information society where communication and information technologies serve as an instrument
of inclusion.
These recent industrial policy pronouncements allow us to venture some conclusions.
First, the explicit content of these statements suggests that what is developing before our eyes is
an effort on the part of an important segment of Latin American policymakers to redefine the
role and content of industrial policies in an era of greater worldwide commercial and financial
integration. It is not an attempt to go back to the past.
Second, while the effort builds on both own past experiences and lessons from other
countries, it is in many ways unprecedented and involves a modicum of breaking new ground,
experimentation, and charting of unfamiliar territory.  To that extent, it can be said that the new
policies are still in the stage of taking shape and gaining an identity of their own.
Third, as intimated above, a remarkable feature of these and similar formulations is that
they strive to address issues (such as productivity, efficiency, product-quality, etc.) revolving
around the central question of to how to raise the countries’ competitiveness.  The underlying
assumptions are that trade liberalization was necessary; that it is here to stay; that, on the other
hand, it is not only desirable but also possible to change the prevailing world distribution of
comparative advantage so as to increase the region’s exports of manufacturing goods (and even
                                                                                                                                                                                          
mechanisms; iv) deregulation of external trade; v) promoting recovery of the ship-building sector; vi) stepping up
activities in the areas of quality and productivity; vii) modernization of technical regulations; vii) further
development of Brazilian design; viii) providing support to small-scale producers and crafts; and ix) promotion of
micro- and small-enterprises in the Northeast.
18 See RedeGoverno (2001).12
of high-technology goods and services) and decrease the dependence on primary-sector-related
exports; and that the government has a role to play in this pursuit.
2.3  The Theoretical Background of the Emerging Policies
The most explicit policy statements demonstrate that the emerging industrial policies move away
from a pure laissez faire approach in that they explicitly advocate government intervention in the
economy.  They also differ from the import-substitution approach, as the forms of government
intervention they advocate differ from those championed by that approach.  In theoretical
background as well as practice, then, one should expect these policies to depart from these two
policymaking traditions.
The central problem posed by the new approach is how to increase the competitiveness of
a small, open economy through a welfare-enhancing time path.  When the question is posed this
way, several underlying assumptions are worth stating. Perhaps the main assumption is that
policy interventions can help an otherwise market-based economy, both constrained and spurred
by the forces of international competition, to transit from a state characterized by a vector of
goods produced where many (or most) of the goods characteristic of the advanced stages of
industrial and/or knowledge-based production are deficient to a new vector where a big enough
(and/or good enough) subset of those goods is produced by a nation’s economy. An apparently
major normative criterion for this effort is that the transition should be made in a reasonable
time-frame so as to mobilize the hopes and energies of the current generation.  Such a transition
is, furthermore, assumed to be welfare-enhancing for the bulk of the population, as it would
entail an increasing adoption of gradually more productive technologies that would raise the real
wages of the working class and increase the size of the professional and business classes.
The most pertinent theoretical arguments for state intervention aimed at changing the
vector of goods produced can be conveniently grouped in five classes: 1) arguments that seek to
justify intervention to promote the production of particular goods on the basis of the latter’s
exhibiting economies of scale 2) arguments that support intervention to promote the production
of goods when the production process is associated with learning by doing, whether within the
firm or outside the firm; 3) arguments that seek to justify subsidizing research and development
activities of private firms, as these activities generate positive externalities; 4) arguments that
seek to justify state intervention to stimulate investment in human capital by both private firms13
and households on account of the externalities characteristic of that activity; and 5) arguments
that rely on the presence of imperfections in the capital and product markets due to asymmetries
of information.
19 This arsenal of arguments, taken from the field of Welfare Economics, has been
deployed by advocates of active industrial policies all over the world, particularly in Europe and
North America.
In Latin America these arguments have been supplemented with empirical and historical
arguments in favor of an active policy.  The main arguments can be found in ECLAC (1995) and
are conveniently summarized by Kosacoff and Ramos (1999).  These arguments appeal to the
fact that, in most late-developing countries, the government has played an active role in
completing or perfecting markets, providing substitutes for them when necessary and generating
an environment that stimulates investment and innovation.
20  They also contend that the
experience of successful countries sheds light on general criteria for industry-promotion policy.
For example, public policy is effective when it seeks to facilitate the operation of the market
rather than trying to take its place and when it acts in a selective and transparent manner with an
awareness of its own limitations and tries to frustrate rent-seeking activities.  In addition,
competitive advantages can be acquired through industrial policy if the incentives provided are
only transitory; scales of production in the promoted industries are sufficiently large; and the use
of either outdated technologies or those still in an experimental stage is avoided.
3. The Anatomy of Current Industrial Policies in Latin America and the
Caribbean
Understood in the broadest sense of the term, industrial policies include a wide variety of
elements, traditionally divided into six subsets: 1) trade policies; 2) investment policies; 3)
science and technology policies; 4) policies aimed at promoting micro-, small-, and medium-size
enterprises; 5) human-resource training and upgrading policies; and 6) regional development
                                                          
19 For a critical review of these arguments by a leading economist, see Grossman (1990).
20 These arguments also point out that the available historical evidence suggests that there is a wide range of
alternatives with regard to intervention: development led by conglomerates (South Korea) or by small and medium-
size enterprises (Taiwan); growth led by local firms, or by public, or transnational enterprises; development based
on natural resources cum forward linkages to activities with higher value added (Denmark, Sweden and Finland in
the past; Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia at present) or on a direct initial push in manufacturing (Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan); initial openness based on export promotion with limited import liberalization (most South East
Asian countries) or free trade almost from the start (Hong-Kong, Singapore).14
policies.
21  However, for the purposes of this survey a simpler taxonomy will be used.  Leaving
aside for the moment policies to promote small- and medium-size enterprises, the entire
industrial-policy set is divided into three different (although not mutually excluding) standpoints
resulting in three classes of policy areas, namely: a) export promotion policies; b) policies to
promote output growth and investment; and c) policies to promote higher productivity and
competitiveness.
The rationale behind this simpler classification is twofold.  First, given the obvious
importance of exports for any industrial policy in the current era of increasing trade and financial
integration, it seems appropriate to consider export promotion policies as constituting a category
of their own.  Second, as for the remaining elements in the policy set, a reasonable principle of
classification is to distinguish between, on one hand, policies whose main effect is to increase
present and future output and, on the other, policies that change the way output is produced,
presumably in the sense of increasing technical and economic efficiency.  The first set of policies
provides incentives to producers to “do more of the same.”  By contrast, polices in the second set
aim at encouraging them “to change their ways,” i.e., to produce more efficiently.  In other
words, while in its pure form the first set of policies leads to sheer increases in output and
investment, leaving firms’ production functions unchanged, the second set deliberately intend to
alter firms’ production functions.
22          
It should be noted that this survey of current industrial policies in the region excludes two
areas: regional development policies and specific policies to promote the agricultural sector.
These are subjects that merit an extensive treatment that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
3.1 Export Promotion Policies
Export promotion policies in Latin American and the Caribbean can be classified into three
broad categories: 1) policies that affect the availability and/or cost of credit; 2) fiscal incentives;
and 3) provision of non-financial services to exporters.  Although we readily admit that the latter
                                                          
21 Some also include environmental policies as a subset of industrial policies.  While we do not resist the general
idea that environmental policies do affect the vector of goods and services produced in the economy we shall refrain
from discussing them in this survey.
22 It should go without saying that this distinction is purely analytical.  One would be hard pressed to find pure real-
world examples of the two type of policies in question.  However, it is not unreasonable to assert that horizontal
lines of credit to finance working capital are essentially a policy of the first type and incentives to technological
innovation are a policy of the second type.15
type of services are important for the success of an export promotion strategy, and may even be
decisive, the present analysis is restricted to the first two categories.
3.1.1  Financial Incentives
A. Credit Provision
Table 1 shows that fourteen countries in the region have devised institutional schemes to provide
credit to their exporters. While only five countries have established specialized export credit
agencies, another six countries have special credit lines for exporters in their main public-sector
development banks, and the remaining three countries provide credit to exporters through credit
lines open to all producers regardless of the destination of their products.
There is a rough correlation between size of the economy and institutional provision of
credit: most of the smaller economies (particularly in the Caribbean) do not provide nationally-
based, institutional credit facilities to their exporters.  The Caribbean countries, for instance, rely
instead on outright grants from the Caribbean Export Development Agency.
Some general features of these credit schemes are worth mentioning as they characterize
the market-oriented and open-economy thrust of the emerging industrial policies in the Region.
First, in most countries the governmental agencies in charge of financing exports are second-tier
financial institutions.16





























Argentina YES X X X X X
Bahamas NO NO
Barbados NO NO X
Belize NO NO
Bolivia NO NO
Brazil NO YES X X X X
Chile NO YES X X X
23 X
Colombia YES X X X X X





24 NO X X X
El Salvador NO YES X X X X
Guatemala NO NO X X
Guyana NO NO
Haiti NO NO
Honduras YES X X
Jamaica NO NO
M e x i c o Y E S Y E S XXX XX
25 X
Nicaragua NO NO X X
Panama NO NO
Paraguay NO NO





Uruguay NO YES X X
Venezuela YES X X X
Second, in practically all cases the pricing of loans follows market principles, with rates
that reflect the market cost of money.  Interest rates are normally freely negotiated between the
first-tier (generally private) financial institution and the individual exporter.  Third, in most cases
the available credit lines are open only to non-traditional exporters.
                                                          
23 Only for foreign buyers of Chilean durable goods and engineering services.
24 In Ecuador there is neither a specialized export credit agency nor special export credit lines from the public-sector
development bank, the Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN).   However, the CFN has the strategic goal of
assigning at least 50 percent of its disbursements to “productive investment in international trade.”
25 The Mexican External Trade Bank, Bancomext, gives partial grants (up to 50 percent of costs) to finance market
research, image-promotion campaigns, and promotion of Mexican trade fairs.17
The support extended by export credit agencies to exporters involves two basic types of
loan: 1) loans to finance working capital; and 2) loans to finance fixed investment costs.  While
fourteen countries limit themselves to providing loans of the first type, ten countries extend to
their exporters loans of both types.  On the other hand, buyers’ credit (loans to foreign buyers of
domestic exports) is less frequent, as only seven countries offer this credit facility to their
exporters.
Credit facilities in some countries go beyond the types mentioned above.  Some export
credit agencies have been particularly innovative in developing new financial products and
services, such as specific credit facilities for the exporters of capital goods.
26 Another area where
innovation has occurred is that of credit to finance entire investment projects.  Unlike more
traditional credit lines that, at best, finance the purchase of discrete sets of capital goods, these
credit lines include financing for plant construction and/or renovation, related public works, and
even land purchases.
27 Additional innovations in financial assistance to the commercialization of
exports
28 include market-opening activities, defined here as the set of actions which have to be
carried out by an exporting firm if it is to pry open a particular foreign market.
29
Argentina and Colombia are the two countries where financial assistance to exporters
covers a wider range of areas than in most other countries of the region.  Besides credit lines of
the type mentioned above, both countries have credit facilities to finance the subscription of
equity capital by domestic producers in order to form corporations whose purpose is to produce
goods for the external market.
30
                                                          
26 The Banco de la Nación Argentina, for instance, offers medium-term (five-year) loans to Argentine exporters of
capital goods. In Brazil, financial support to the exporters of capital goods assumes a more sector-oriented shape.
Thus, with resources from the Merchant Marine Fund, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social,
BNDES provides loans to Brazilian shipyards for ship construction to meet orders from foreign buyers.
27 Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are the leaders in this area.
28 Chile’s Corporation for the Promotion of Production (CORFO), for instance, has a credit line to finance the
construction of commercialization infrastructure (representation offices, stores, warehouses, etc.) in foreign
countries by non-traditional domestic exporters.
29 The most innovative agencies provide financing for such activities as attendance to trade fairs; the carrying out of
commercial missions and business trips by domestic exporters; the research and development of new products aimed
at satisfying the requirements of consumers in foreign markets; and the technical assistance and training required to
implement international quality norms (ISO norms).
30 The Colombian Bank for External Trade (Bancoldex) also provides liability consolidation loans to exporters in
order to alleviate their cash flow problems; loans to finance investment projects in the area of transport infrastructure
aimed at improving the country’s external competitiveness (and with private sector participation); loans to leasing
companies to finance leasing contracts subscribed by Colombian exporters provided that the leasing contracts are
about goods utilized in the production or commercialization of exports; loans for the partial or total relocation of
export firms’ productive plants in coastal zones so that they can reduce costs and be more competitive in the
international market.  The Colombian export credit agency also has a credit line with incentives to projects that18
An interesting innovation is Banco do Brasil’s program of export financing with
equalization of financial costs.  The basic idea is to compensate domestic exporters for the higher
interest rates they normally have to pay so as to equalize their financial costs with those of their
competitors in the international market.
A few export credit agencies in the region have established credit lines to stimulate
exports from particular regions within the given country as part of broader regional development
strategies.
31
B. Credit Insurance Schemes
Learning from their counterparts in the developed countries, credit agencies in the region have
evolved export credit insurance schemes that protect the exporter against both the commercial
and political risks of a foreign buyer defaulting on payments.  Seven countries in the region
provide credit insurance services to their exporters.
C. Outright Grants
In a few countries, notably in the Caribbean, the financial promotion of exports is carried out
through outright grants to exporters.  The Caribbean Export Development Agency
32 provides
grants on a cost-sharing basis to enhance export firms’ competitiveness.  The grants are restricted
to enterprises operating in the manufacturing and services sectors; firms in the agricultural sector
are not eligible except where the export-related activities they engage in bring with them
considerable value added.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
include in their design important technological innovations or that generate noticeable externalities benefiting a
broad industrial sector or an important segment of a production chain.  Colombia’s Bancoldex is also a pioneer
institution in the area of granting loans to exporters for the purpose of enhancing their liquidity.  Through two credit
facilities, namely, “Liquidex in pesos” and “Liquidex in USD” Bancoldex buys from the Colombian exporter, at a
discount, the export purchase contract subscribed by the foreign importer and this with no recourse against the
Colombian exporter.   Bancoldex buys up to 85 percent in pesos and 90 percent in dollars of the invoiced values.
31 Thus, in Brazil, the Financial Constitutional Fund for the Center-West, a financial institution created by the
Brazilian Federal government to promote the social and economic development of the country’s Center-West region,
has a credit facility for export promotion, and Colombia’s Bancoldex has a multipurpose credit line for exporters of
the small islands of San Andrés and Providencia.
32 The member countries of the Caribbean Export Development Agency are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad-Tobago.19
3.1.2 Fiscal Incentives
Regarding fiscal incentives to exports, the emerging industrial policies in the Latin American and
Caribbean countries are consistent with external and internal liberalization and reliance on
market forces.  Thus the main feature of the new pattern of fiscal incentives is the diminishing
role of subsidies.  While a few subsidies still remain, the dominant trend is towards their
complete disappearance.
33
As shown in Table 2, the main fiscal devices to promote exports are: 1) refunds on
payments of “internal” taxes (i.e,. taxes other than import duties); 2) drawback schemes; 3)
temporary admission schemes; 4) export processing zones; and 5) incentives to the creation and
operation of trading companies.






















Belize X X X
35
Bolivia X X X X
Brazil X X X X
Chile X X






Ecuador X X X
El Salvador X X X X
Guatemala X X X X
Guyana
Haiti XX
Honduras X X X
37
Jamaica X X X
38
                                                          
33 Or, at the very least, of those that are incompatible with WTO rules.
34 Exemption from both import duties and internal taxes on corporate profits are not limited to export production.
All manufacturers benefit from a ten-year tax holiday.  However, for exporters in the manufacturing sector the tax
holiday is prolonged for an indefinite number of years into the future as they benefit from a very low (2.5 percent)
tax rate on corporate profits after the initial ten-year tax holiday is over.
35 Tax holidays are given to all investors (both foreign and domestic).  However, while the typical tax-holiday period
is five years, the Fiscal Incentives Act of 1990, allows for extensions of up to twenty additional years if production
is strictly for export and highly labor-intensive.
36 The Costa Rican Active Transformation Regime combines (and in some particular aspects even goes beyond) the
attributes of tax refund schemes, drawback schemes, and temporary admission schemes.




















Mexico X X X X
Nicaragua X X X
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Panama X X
Paraguay X X X






Uruguay X X X X
Venezuela X X X X
A. Tax-Refund Schemes
The typical tax refund provides a total or partial refund of the indirect taxes and contributions
paid in the several stages of production and (internal) commercialization of the exported good.
As the principal aim of the tax-refund schemes is to avoid double taxation, the tax payments
refunded are typically those related to value-added taxes and other excise taxes but also include
exemptions on payroll taxes and similar contributions.  In a number of countries, the tax refund
instrument is a freely negotiable market instrument, the Tax Refund Certificate (TRC), which
can be used for the payment of any kind of taxes, including corporate income taxes and import
duties.  In some cases, the TRC mechanism includes a subsidy component and therefore it will
have to be either modified or (in the case of non-agricultural exports) phased out to comply with
WTO rules.
The most innovative country in the area of tax refunds is Mexico, which has set up the
Highly Exporting Firms Program (known by its Spanish acronym ALTEX).  The program
enables firms that make at least 40 percent of their total sales to the export market to benefit from
very simplified and expeditious export and import formalities and, most importantly, to quickly
recover the ad valorem tax on domestic inputs.
41
                                                                                                                                                                                          
38 In Jamaica the exemption from the income tax is partial.  The amount of the rebate depends on export
performance.
39 Some items used in export production (notably machinery and raw materials) are duty-free.
40 Exports of services are exempted from the General Sales Tax.
41 Actually, the Mexican government’s legal commitment in the context of the Program is to give back the tax
payments in five working days!21
A variant of tax refund that is used in some countries is the refund regime on turn-key
projects.  This variant aims at stimulating the sale to foreign buyers of complete production units,
including production plants, engineering works and other physical facilities.
B. Drawback Schemes
Drawback schemes are the standard instrument used to enable exporting firms to compensate for
the anti-export bias stemming from import tariffs.  They allow exporters to recover duties paid
on imported inputs utilized in export production.  As shown in Table 2, sixteen countries have
some type of drawback scheme.  In addition, Chile and the Dominican Republic have simplified
drawback schemes for non-traditional exports whereby the refund is made without any
requirement of documentary support that a given proportion of imported inputs have been used
in the case at hand.
42
In the area of drawback schemes, Mexico is again the most innovative country. It has
gone beyond the traditional reimbursement mechanism to an exemption scheme where, instead
of refunding duties ex-post, an outright exemption allows exporters to avoid paying duties in the
first place, thus reducing their working capital needs.
43
C. Temporary Admission Schemes
Temporary admission schemes involve temporarily allowing exporting firms to introduce into
the given country inputs, raw materials, intermediate goods, capital goods and spare parts
employed in export production with total or partial exemption from taxes and import duties.  As
can be seen from Table 2, twelve countries in the region include this type of scheme in their
fiscal incentives to exporters.  Perhaps the best- known example is the Mexican Maquiladora
regime, which has been a major factor in that country’s successful export performance.
44  In
some cases, temporary admission schemes have a built-in subsidy component, which will have to
be eliminated to comply with WTO rules.
                                                          
42 It is, in fact, an export subsidy and, because of this, incompatible with WTO rules.  The Chilean government is
phasing it out.
43 The Mexican program allows exemption not only from import duties but also from the value-added tax and any
antidumping duties that may apply.  However, to be eligible for participation in it, firms must meet minimum
requirements as to the amount of exports they carry out.  Due to the superiority of this exemption scheme, the
traditional drawback mechanism continues to exist but lost relevance and is now utilized almost exclusively by firms
that are occasional exporters.  Only a tiny percentage of total Mexican exports use this scheme22
D. Export Processing Zones and Trading Companies
Export processing zones (EPZs) are an arrangement whereby exporting firms locate their
manufacturing plants inside an in-bond, common physical space and receive a set of fiscal
incentives in exchange for the commitment to produce and/or transform goods for the external
market.
45  As shown in Table 2, twenty countries offer the EPZ option to both foreign investors
and domestic exporters, making this instrument the most widely used fiscal-incentive vehicle.
Legislation in a number of countries provides incentives to the creation and growth of firms
specializing in external trade operations.  The incentives typically include exemption from value-
added taxes and from the tax withholding requirements on certain payments to which many
ordinary transactions are subjected.  Table 2 shows that five countries provide incentives for the
creation of trading companies.
3.2 Fiscal and Financial Incentives to Production and Investment
Fiscal and financial incentives to production and investment are incentives that are granted to all
producers regardless of whether they produce for the domestic or the external market. They can
be broken down into four categories, namely: 1) horizontal provision of credit and other financial
services; 2) horizontal fiscal incentives; and 3) credit and/or fiscal incentives to producers of
particular sectors, and 4) credit and/or fiscal incentives to producers located in particular
geographical (presumably less developed) regions within the country.  Table 3 provides an
overview of how these types of incentives are being used in the region.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
44 According to ten Kate et al. (2000), Maquila exports grew at an annual average growth rate of 20 percent between
1982 and 1995.
45 Fiscal incentives to locate in such zones usually include: i) exemption from corporate income taxes for periods of
time of up to 20 years; ii) exemption from taxes on dividends and profits; iii) exemption from import and export
duties on capital equipment, intermediate goods, and spare parts; iv) exemption from sales, excise, and consumption
taxes; v) exemption from taxes on transfers of profits; vi) exemption from restrictions on foreign exchange; and vii)
freedom from industrial regulations applying elsewhere in the country.  In addition to these incentives, firms in
export processing zones usually benefit from simplified and expeditious export procedures (such as customs
inspection at the zone); strategic location (e.g., proximity to the ports, airports, or key roads); existence in the zone
of a modern physical infrastructure (warehouses, roads, power plants, etc.); and complementarities and economies of
scale in the use of such services as security and employee transportation.23










































































                                                          
46 The notation X(ip) means that there are credit lines for entire investment projects and, a fortiori, for discrete
capital goods.  The plain X indicates that only loans for discrete sets of fixed assets are available.
47 Other than agriculture.
48 Income is tax-free and imports to be used in investment projects are duty-free.
49 The tax incentive is for foreign investors.  Offshore companies are taxed at a rate significantly below the rate for
local companies.
50 The BNDES (through BNDESPAR) contributes with equity capital to two Regional Funds for Emerging
Enterprises (in the states of Santa Catarina and Minas Gerais), which, in turn, lend to emerging firms.  It also has
special credit facilities for the Northeast, the Amazon, the South, and the Center-West regions.
51 There are federal tax investment incentives for the Northeast and Amazon regions.
52 There are two main horizontal forms of tax incentive to investment (including re-investment of profits):
i) Accelerated depreciation is granted for new fixed assets acquired domestically and for imported fixed assets; ii)
personal income tax and Additional Tax apply only when profits are distributed.
53 Colombia’s Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI) has a credit line for firms located in border zones; and another








































Ecuador X X(ip) X Mining,
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Nicaragua X X Tourism
                                                                                                                                                                                          
54 There are two special tax regimes that favor particular regions recently affected by natural disasters.  They are the
Páez Law and the Quimbaya Law. The first is applicable to the zones affected by the flooding of the Páez River in
1995 and the second to the coffee-producing zone affected by the earthquake of January, 1999.
55 The services industries included with credit lines of their own are: tourism, transportation, software, and other
services.
56 Haiti has a comprehensive tax holiday scheme.
57 Through the Sector Promotion Program (PROSEC), firms in twenty-two industries in the manufacturing sector
can import goods at a preferential rate to be used in the respective manufacturing sector to produce final goods either


































Panama X X Tourism,
forestry
Paraguay X X X
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58 Paraguay has a five-year-duration tax holiday for new investments.
59 The duration of the tax-holiday mentioned in footnote 15 is longer (ten years) if the company making the
investment locates in the Departments of Guairá, Caazapá, Ñeembecú, Concepción, or in the Eastern Region.
60 Manufacturing enterprises operating in the border provinces and in the Amazon region are exempt from the
income tax, the VAT, and the excise taxes.
61 According to the U.S. State Department, the Surinamese government has the legal power to grant tax holidays on
a case-by-case basis.  Investors are then “dealt with by the appropriate ministries through a process that can be “very
slow (...), and is not immune from patronage and favoritism.  Besides the tax holiday, the incentive packages
negotiated on that ad hoc basis can include long-term land leases (presumably at favorable terms compared to
market), factory space, and preferential credit.  An investment law is being prepared that will include a ten-year tax
holiday as the key investment incentive.
62 Trinidad and Tobago grants comprehensive tax holidays of up to ten years.
63 A tax exemption is available on profits reinvested in manufacturing firms, farming, and hotel facilities.  In
addition, there is a partial relief from capital tax through computing the fiscal value of industrial equipment at fifty
percent.
64 New investments in manufacturing industry, agriculture, fishing, fish farming, livestock, and tourism receive a tax
rebate of 20 percent.  Furthermore, the capital gains tax is one percent.
65 New investments in hydrocarbon production enjoy a tax rebate of 8 percent.  The purchase of capital equipment
and services for new investment in oil, mining, agriculture, and fisheries is exempt from the wholesale tax.26
3.2.1 Horizontal Provision of Credit
Fifteen countries in the region currently operate public-sector financial corporations
66 or
development banks that provide medium-to-long-term loans and related financial services to
producers; most operate as second-tier institutions and charge market-determined interest rates.
In most countries, credit to producers is usually granted in two basic modalities: 1) medium-term
loans to finance working capital; 2) long-term loans to finance investment projects (including the
discrete purchase of fixed assets).
67   
As in the case of export credits, the credit institutions granting these loans have, in a
number of countries, gone beyond the basic modalities and introduced an array of innovations.
68
An area that is being developed by the leading institutions is equity investment in private firms.
The governmental development banks undertake this type investments in order to pursue
objectives such as strengthening the capital structure of the beneficiary firms, supporting new
investments, fostering the entry of new investment partners (both foreign and domestic) into the
firm in question, developing the local capital markets, or assisting restructuring processes that
take the shape of mergers or acquisitions.  In the typical case, the stated policy is to take equity
positions only as a minority shareholder, and on a temporary and selective basis, in profitable
companies or projects.
69  The development finance agency’s participation in share subscription
operations can be direct or indirect.  In the latter case, participation is carried out through equity
investment funds of different types.
70
                                                          
66 In some countries such as Argentina the second-tier financial institution playing the role to be described here is a
private sector intermediary with government participation.
67 In a number of cases, the loans can be denominated in domestic or foreign currency (US dollars).  In most cases,
credit beneficiaries are given grace periods that vary from one country to the next. Interest rates are usually variable
but in some cases they are fixed.
68 The leading institutions provide, for instance, one or more of the following types of loans or financial services: i)
loans to restructure liabilities; ii) loans to pay for consultancy services; iii) loans to finance environmental impact
studies; iv) loans to prevent or eliminate the emission of toxic substances into the environment or to refinance the
recycling of polluting substances; v) loans for the improvement of commercial practices; vi) loans to finance the
leasing of capital goods; vii) loans for civil projects and installations; viii) loans to finance real-estate developments;
ix) medium- and long-term US-dollar auctions; and x) provision of guarantees.
69 For instance, in the case of Brazil, a company must meet several explicit criteria if the Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social, BNDES, is to participate in a share subscription operation: i) it must have
competitive advantages in the market where it operates; ii) it must be profitable; iii) the company’s management
must be apt, professional, and efficient; and iv) the company’s shares must be publicly traded or, if that is not the
case, it must make a commitment to go public.
70 The leading institution in equity investments is Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social
(BNDES). BNDES carries out equity investment operations through a subsidiary, BNDESPAR.  As a specialized
equity branch, BNDESPAR operates through two main credit facilities (one that organizes its participation in share
subscription operations and one specializing in the granting of guarantees), and six special programs.  The special27
That there is no shortage of inventiveness and creativity is demonstrated not only by the
variety of credit facilities mentioned above but also by some remarkable innovations. Chile and
El Salvador, for instance, provide long-term loans for undergraduate and graduate university
studies (both at home and abroad) to individual Chilean and Salvadoran students as investment
loans and, consequently, allocate resources of their finance development corporations (to be lent
on through first-tier institutions) to this crucial aspect of capital formation.
71   Another such
innovation is Chile’s CORFO credit line to promote productive alliances between groups of
companies so that they can jointly solve management and commercialization problems in the
execution of a shared productive project.  The leading thread behind this type of loan is the idea
of helping individual companies to attain, through collective action, economies of scale that
otherwise would be unavailable to them.   A third innovation worth mentioning is Chile’s and
Mexico’s effort to stimulate development of supplier networks.  These are loans aimed at
strengthening companies that supply unfinished, intermediate goods to a large manufacturing
company.  These loans are important because rather than just benefiting isolated companies, they
strengthen whole production chains involving a set of small- and medium-size firms connected
to one large enterprise.
3.2.2 Non-Horizontal Credit Policies
Development finance policies are also being used to favor particular sectors and/or specific
regions within a country.  As shown in Table 3, development banks in six countries provide lines
favoring particular sectors and four countries provide credit lines designed to promote production
and investment in particular regions.  It would be wrong, however, to interpret the existence of
all such credit lines (particularly when they relate to specific productive sectors) as merely
remnants of the protectionist and state-interventionist spirit of the import-substitution era.  A
                                                                                                                                                                                          
programs are: i) The Program for the Capitalization of Technologically-Based Companies; ii) the Program for the
Capitalization of Small Enterprises; iii) the Mutual Fund for Investment in Emerging Enterprises; iv) The Mutual
Fund for Investment in Pre-Market Enterprises (which in BNDES’ terminology are medium-size firms that are
preparing themselves to issue shares in the stock market); v) the Program to Support New Corporations; and vi) the
Investment Program in Quotas of Stock Investment Funds.
71 What is remarkable about this is not, of course, the existence of the loans as such.  Loans for university studies are
a decades-old institution in Latin America and the Caribbean.  What is remarkable is that, in the Chilean and
Salvadoran institutional design, they are conceived as investment loans to be professionally handled by a major
second-tier institution specialized in long-term credit.  The traditional conception used to be (and still is in some
countries) to (mis)conceive these loans as a part of  the government’s current expenditure and to leave their
administration to a non-financial entity ascribed to the Ministry of Education.28
later section on policies to enhance productivity and competitiveness will address the meaning of
some of these policies.
3.2.3 Fiscal Incentives
A. Tax  Incentives
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the structural reform process in Latin American and the
Caribbean countries included a general repealing of tax incentives.  Tax incentives were rightly
seen as both sources of distortion in resource allocation and contributing factors to recurrent
fiscal imbalances, with their sequel of macroeconomic destabilization.  No attempt has since then
been made to resurrect the policy of relying on substantial and numerous tax incentives.  More
importantly, the search for new industrial policies that began in the mid-1990s is premised, inter
alia, on the need to leave tax subsidies as a thing of the past.
In light of the policy record in the countries where new trends in industrial-policy
thinking are taking shape, it seems safe to conclude that the emerging set of industrial policies
assigns no significant role to tax incentives.  This demonstrates that the advocates of the new
industrial policies understand the need to build on the accomplishments of the structural reform
process.
Surveying the existing fiscal incentives in LAC countries, Table 3 shows that in
practically all Latin American countries, tax incentives are a minor phenomenon.
72 Although
there are horizontal tax-incentive schemes in five non-Caribbean countries, their scope is more or
less limited, and therefore their existence does not belie the general conclusion that significant
tax incentives schemes are conspicuously absent.  The only kind of tax incentive mechanism that
is found in most countries is that associated with the free trade zones (FTZs) where, typically,
producers are exempt from most (if not all) taxes.  But, obviously, given the highly specialized
and localized nature of FTZ incentives, this fact does not have any special significance.
73
                                                          
72 The reader must bear in mind that this conclusion is only valid for the Latin American countries. The issue of tax
policies is posed in an altogether different manner for the Caribbean countries (other than Cuba, the Dominican
Republic and Haiti) than it is for the Latin American economies.
73 Other than the facts already highlighted not much more can be gleaned from Table 3.  Let us, however, briefly
point out, notwithstanding their lesser import, some other findings that were derived from the research that led to the
construction of that table: i) in some countries foreign firms are exempted from the tax on profit remittances if the
profits are reinvested; ii) in a few countries, investment tax credits are allowed for a specified period of time; iii) in a
small number of countries, governments grant tax stability to foreign investors; iv) in still other countries, domestic
and foreign companies are allowed to choose to invest part of their tax bill on certain government-approved projects.29
As we leave behind the area of tax incentives of general applicability and move to other
types of tax incentives, we come across with two other areas where the empirical material is
more suggestive.  The areas in question are: 1) tax incentives to producers in particular regions,
and 2) tax incentives to producers of specific sectors.  Table 3 shows that the national
governments of five countries have established tax incentives for less developed regions.
74  The
table also shows that, in eighteen countries, national governments have designed fiscal incentives
to benefit certain productive sectors.
75
B.  Subsidies
Table 3 also shows the subsidies granted by national governments to specific regions and
particular sectors.  While the use of subsidies is not widespread, it is worth noting that in this
policy area, like others, most countries can learn from the region’s leaders.  In this respect, it is
important to note the way Chile handles subsidies to less developed regions. Two aspects of the
Chilean approach merit particular attention: 1) the innovative character of the array of subsidies
offered and 2) the institutional transparency of the subsidy system.
76
                                                          
74 These incentives typically include most or all of the following: i) exemption from all (or part) of central-
government income taxes; ii) exemption from import duties on capital goods; and iii) exemption from VAT and
excise taxes. Bear in mind that the information in the table and hence the comment in the text refer to regional tax
incentives established by the national government.  Tax incentives established by the sub-national levels of
government (i.e., by the provincial or local governments) are an altogether different matter and the table provides no
information about them as they are beyond the scope of the present chapter.
75 In most cases, the favored sectors are tourism and such primary sectors as oil, mining, and forestry.   The most
frequent sector-specific tax incentives are: i) exemptions from taxes on profits (these are frequent in the case of
mining); ii) lower rates on corporate income taxes; iii) lower rates on VAT and custom duties; and iv) accelerated
depreciation.  Tourism and hotel construction are a target of generally substantial fiscal incentives in eight countries,
including most of the Caribbean countries.  In seven countries, prospecting and exploration costs in mining activities
are exempted.  Five countries grant important fiscal incentives to forestry activities.  Oil and other hydrocarbons
receive various types of tax exemptions in four countries.  It is important to bear in mind that while fiscal incentives
to oil exploration and mining are basically incentives to foreign direct investment, fiscal incentives to forestry
incorporate ecological considerations as one of their motives.  On the other hand, incentives to tourism can equally
be seen as incentives to an export activity and could have just as well been mentioned in the section on export
promotion policies.
76 The Chilean national government grants regionally-targeted subsidies: i) for the purchase of land for industrial
projects in industrial parks; ii) to the promoters of investment projects; iii) for the training of workers paid by firms;
iv) to land development projects for industrial sites; v) to cover part of the cost of credit insurance in the financing of
investment projects; vi) for pre-feasibility and feasibility studies; and vii) to provide a partial guarantee for default
risk loans granted by financial intermediaries to finance investment projects.  In institutional terms, the Chilean
practice explicitly identifies subsidies as such, and they are transparently quantified for accounting purposes.
Moreover, their administration is professionally and technically handled by the public-sector development finance
corporation (CORFO).30
3.3 Incentives to Productivity Growth and Competitiveness
This area includes all policies (other than export-promotion policies) that aim at expanding the
economy’s production possibilities curve and/or the competitiveness of domestic producers vis-
a-vis foreign producers. These policies fall under four main headings: 1) policies to foster the
integration and strengthening of production chains; 2) policies to promote technological
modernization; 3) policies to promote and protect competition; and 4) explicit policies to
promote private-sector (particularly, firms’) investment in human capital.  Given the nature of
the policies proper to this emerging policy area and the fact that only a handful of countries in
the region have an explicit, albeit still developing, set of policies or instruments, the discussion is
restricted to the leading countries.
3.3.1 Fostering the Integration of Production Chains
In this area the coordination role of public policy is more important than its material-incentive-
allocating role.  Financial and tax incentives continue to be important elements in the battery of
instruments used by policymakers. This notwithstanding, government has a unique ability to
assume a leadership and orientating role by virtue of its being the social entity with the
legitimacy, political and moral authority to summon all sectors of society, the obligation to act in
the name of the whole of society, and, last but not least, the ability to put in action a network of
institutions capable to act on (or influence) a broad front of social activities. This policy area
displays, moreover, the formal property of having an integrating character in that the deliberate
effort to consolidate concrete production chains requires (and implies) the coherent and
coordinated use of policy instruments belonging to other policy areas (e.g., incentives to
technological modernization).  The set of instruments used may (or, even, must) vary from one
specific production chain to the next and, for a given production chain, from one year to the next,
but the integrating character of the policy aimed at strengthening it is an inescapable feature of
this sort of policymaking.
As suggested above, the two leading countries in this area are Mexico and Colombia.
Both countries have explicit definitions of the specific production chains to be strengthened, the
actions to be taken, and the policy instruments to be employed.31
Mexico targets the production chains of eight sectors:
77 high-technology industries; the
automotive industry; light manufacturing; the petrochemical industry; mining; agribusiness;
forestry; and public-sector providers.   The Mexican policy document identifies a set of actions
to materialize the policy objectives in this area, and these actions share two related features.
First, direct economic incentives (financial, fiscal, and the like) do not play a leading role.
Second, implicit in the document is the notion that the national government (and the sub-national
governments as well) must operate in such a way as to put the public sector coordinating
capacity at the service of private-sector efforts.
The actions prescribed are as follows: 1) playing a coordinating role at the regional level
to support private-sector efforts toward the formation of clusters of firms around each particular
production chain; 2) strengthening of the existing internal “corridors” linking the southern
regions of the country to the northern regions whereby the former supply raw materials,
intermediate goods, and consumer goods to the latter, where export-oriented production prevails;
and 3) implementing an integral industrial information strategy aimed at helping the firms in a
precise and timely manner to detect opportunities to act as suppliers to other firms belonging to
the same or a related production chain.
The last component deserves further discussion as it nicely illustrates areas where
government can be instrumental in supporting the private sector in an era of greater international
integration.  The two main elements in the Mexican informational strategy are: 1) the further
development of the informational resources, mechanisms and infrastructure with the objective of
establishing a national network of industrial information;
78 and 2) the realization of business
conventions (called Supplier Development and Export Support National Conventions) where
large enterprises can advertise their supply needs and meet potential providers.
79
The Colombian strategy
80 makes a distinction between, on one hand, existing production
chains that require further strengthening and development and, on the other hand, new
production chains to be promoted in order to make the country a player in markets where, for the
                                                          
77 See Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento Industrial de México  (1995).
78 The relevant information is, of course, information about the national stock of supplier firms and about the
demand for, and the supply of, inputs.  The information instruments include the National Industry Directory, the
Registry of Enterprises, and the information banks implemented by the so-called Subcontractors’ Stocks.
79 As is well known to practical businessmen and businesswomen, business conventions are a particularly efficient
(cost-minimizing) way of acquiring information and doing business.  The Mexican supplier development
conventions are major events.  The policy document we relied on states that, in the first of those meetings (with an
attendance of about 10,000 people), 43 large enterprises requested suppliers for 2,353 inputs.32
most part, it is now absent.  The first category is, in turn, broken down into two sub-categories.
The first consists of significant non-traditional exporters that are threatened by external
competition.  Here, the targeted production chains are: 1) cotton-fibers-textiles-apparel; 2)
leather-leather manufactures-footwear; 3) automotive parts-cars; 4) sugar cane-sugar-
confectionery-chocolates; 5) oleaginous seeds-cooking oil-fats-soap; 5) aquaculture; 6) tuna
production; 7) toiletries, cleaning products, and cosmetics; and 8) potatoes and their industrial
processing. The second sub-category within the class of existing production chains includes
those that generate important linkages and are significant in the country’s internal trade. These
targeted production chains are associated with the following goods (or sectors): petrochemicals
and plastics; steel; electric and electronic appliances; forestry, wood products, and furniture;
vegetables; fruits and their industrial transformation; cocoa and chocolates; beans; rice; shrimp;
fish; cereals; dietetic foods; poultry farming; porcine production; dairy farming; medical
services; engineering services; consulting services; software; tourism; jewelry; and crafts. The
category of new production chains includes information technology and software;
microelectronics; biotechnology and biomedicine; new materials; fine chemistry; capital goods;
and communications.
The Colombian strategy sets out the general policy guidelines and some more specific
policy actions necessary to strengthen production chains.  The general guidelines include such
elements as the need to improve both the country’s general physical infrastructure and the
specialized infrastructure needed to support specific production chains; and the need to maintain
legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks favorable to investment, particularly foreign direct
investment.  On the other hand, the specific policy actions can be classified in two categories,
namely: a) general-scope policies, and b) policies to support clusters of firms related to particular
production chains at the regional level.
The general-scope policies are: 1) to help develop cooperative relationships between
firms in a given production chain that can result in projects of mutual benefit; 2) actions in the
field of technological innovation; 3) actions in the area of human capital formation; and 4)
implementation of Sector Competitiveness Agreements with firms in the targeted production
chains.
81
                                                                                                                                                                                          
80 See Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico de Colombia (2000).
81 The Sector Competitiveness Agreements are a dialogue and negotiation mechanism through which the
government and the firms in a given production chain get together to carry out a diagnosis of the particular33
The main regional-scope guidelines have more of a procedural character in that they
merely set out the prescription to open lines of communication with the private sector at the
regional level through the Provincial Councils for Productive Development
82 in order to reach
consensus on Sector Agendas for Regional Dialogue and Sector Competitiveness Agreements at
the regional level.
3.3.2 Policies to Promote Technological Modernization
The general policy area known as “science and technology policy” has been for decades a matter
of concern in the region, particularly in the larger countries. In this paper we shall focus on just
one aspect of science and technology policies, namely, public policies to promote technological
modernization and innovation in the productive sector.  But even within this already restricted
area we will further narrow our focus so as to concentrate only on policies to promote
technological innovation in the non-primary sectors of the economy.
Generally speaking, scientific and technological development in Latin America and the
Caribbean does not bear comparison with that of the OECD countries.  Bluntly put, countries in
the region continue to be peripheral to the dominant trends of scientific research and
technological innovation in the industrialized world.  Within this worldwide context, however,
there are substantial differences in the level of scientific and technological capabilities possessed
by countries in the region.  Whereas the largest countries (particularly Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico) have been able to accumulate a considerable amount of human and institutional
resources in their science and technology systems, the smaller countries face a more precarious
situation.  With this background in mind, it seems more productive to limit our survey of
technological modernization policies to the institutionally most advanced countries in the region.
In the leading countries there is a definite preoccupation with, and an explicit policy
towards, making science and technology more relevant to the imperative need of increasing
competitiveness.  As a result, almost every major industrial policy statement in the post-reform
period has given a place of honor to technological modernization as one of the major areas where
government intervention is critical if the domestic private sector’s ability to compete is to be to
enhanced.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
production chain, identify the potential solutions to the diagnosed problems, and make commitments on the specific
private-sector actions and public policies needed to address them.34
The main areas of action for existing technology policies in the region are: 1) promoting
research and development efforts by the private firms themselves; 2) strengthening cooperation
between public sector research institutions and private firms; and 3) creating or strengthening (as
the case may be) the informational infrastructure necessary for the success of research and
development activities by the firms.
There is considerable variation in the way countries go about defining mid-term
objectives for their technology policies.  Mexico’s explicit policy, for instance, defines seven
areas where government efforts must be concentrated: 1) fostering technological transfer as one
of the key dimensions in the strengthening of production chains; 2) promotion of quality norms
and systems in the micro-, small, and medium-size-enterprise sectors; 3) strengthening basic
technological capabilities in micro-, small, and medium-size firms; 4) provision of basic
information to firms concerning issues such as voluntary normalization and the supply of
technology advice and consultancy services; 5) encouraging technology transfer from the more
advanced countries; 6) protection of industrial intellectual property; and 7) stepping up efforts to
create a culture of technological innovation in the business sector.
Brazilian explicit policy (see Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, 1996), by contrast,
focuses on a set of specific sectors grouped in two classes. The first class includes those sectors
where the country has already developed some technological capabilities but where there is still
the need to deepen and further strengthen those capabilities.  This class includes information
technology and automation; aerospace technology (particularly satellites); nuclear technology;
military technology, and agriculture.  The second class consists of sectors where Brazil’s
development ranges from incipient to non-existent.  The sectors singled out here for special
attention are superconductivity, special materials, optical electronics, biotechnology, application
of biotechnology to agriculture, energy conservation and alternative sources of energy.
Promotion of technological research and innovation in the first group is seen as requiring
the mobilization of a whole battery of policy instruments to encourage the firms themselves
(albeit with the support of government and private, non-profit institutions) to undertake the tasks
of technological innovation.  Promotion of research and innovation in the second group is seen as
revolving around the creation and future expansion of world-quality research centers (called
“research centers of excellence” in the policy statements) devoted to basic and applied research.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
82 The Councils are the existing organisms to carry on the dialogue with the private sector at the provincial level.35
The rationale for tackling these research tasks is that, while they do not respond to short-term
market demands, they possess a high medium-to-long-term potential for both productive
application by firms and appropriation of their benefits by society at large.  In addition, the
“research centers of excellence” are not seen as isolated entities. Instead, it is understood that
their success depends on private sector interest, and involvement.
A. Policy Instruments
The policy instruments used by policymakers in the leading countries of the region include: 1)
grants to support scientific and technological development through the funding of research
projects; 2) credit programs aimed at strengthening technological capabilities of industries and
firms; 3) fiscal incentives to technological innovation; 4) programs geared to the needs of
specific, targeted industries; 5) and horizontal programs aimed at addressing needs that emerge
in some special areas of firms’ technological performance.
A.1 Grants to Support Scientific and Technological Development
These grants are typically non-reimbursable grants given to projects selected through a
competitive process.  A distinction is made between, on one hand, scientific research projects
carried out by research institutes and university researchers and, on the other, projects aimed at
technological development at the industry and firm levels, which for the purposes of this survey
are the only category of interest.
For a project to be supported is generally required that it be in accordance with the
priorities defined by the governmental agency in charge of science and technology policy.
83 One
frequent objective found in the technology policy statements is that of fostering partnerships
between firms and academic institutions to pursue research and innovation aimed at solving
technological problems faced by the former and thereby enhancing their productivity and
competitiveness.  In the Brazilian case, there are two appropriate institutional mechanisms
through which these partnerships are promoted.  One is the so-called “Technological Platforms”
which are fora where the relevant stakeholders meet to identify the technological obstacles faced
                                                          
83 The profile and characteristics of this agency vary with the country considered but typically falls within one of
two broad categories.  In most countries, science and technology policy is the responsibility of a decentralized
institution (the more frequent name for this institution being “National Council for Science and Technology” or a36
by a particular productive sector or a specific region in the country and to define the actions to
remove them.  The expected outcome of these meetings is precisely the formation of partnerships
between research institutes, universities and representatives of the particular productive sector
(or region) to formulate cooperative research projects.  These projects are eligible for funding
from the government agencies.
As is customary in the international practice of giving grants, the usual procedure is to
demand that private firms participating in cooperative projects and applying for funds contribute
matching funds to the project at hand.
A.2 Credit Programs
The government agencies usually operate through trust funds, fiduciary funds, or specialized
financial agencies to provide loans to firms, consortia of firms, or consortia of firms and research
institutions, to carry out an articulated set of research and technological development activities
that are expected to result in the invention of new products, significant improvement of the
existing products, improvements in the production processes, strengthening of the infrastructure
for innovation, quality-product improvements, or productivity improvements.  To these basic
core of innovation activities, some of the financial agencies add others such as purchase of
technological and scientific services; acquisition of scientific and technical documentation and
information; consulting services; adaptation of imported products, processes or technologies to
the local conditions; purchase (in the domestic or foreign markets) of product, process and/or
service technologies; strengthening of technical teams devoted to technology development or
technology adaptation; and creation, implementation, and expansion of technological research
centers.
Inspired by the experience of the US. Small Business Administration’s Small Business
Innovation Research Program, the funding agencies typically provide non-reimbursable loans to
technological innovation projects from micro- and small-size enterprises. The two leading
countries in this policy area, Brazil and Mexico, have a number of special credit programs to
encourage technological innovation by firms. Brazil’s initiatives include a first set of credit lines
is a part of the Ministry of Science and Technology’s Program to Support Scientific and
Technological Development, funded by the World Bank and includes two programs, namely: a)
                                                                                                                                                                                          
variant thereof.  In several countries, though, including Brazil and Venezuela, the agency in question has the status37
the Program to Support Technological Sector Entities (TSEs), and b) the Program for
Technology Management and Competitiveness.
The TSEs are non-profit organizations that perform one or more of the following services
to the firms of a particular productive sector: 1) product research and development; 2) provision
of technical services; 3) metrology, normalization, and certification services; 4) quality
management; 5) training; and 6) organization of technological information banks.
The Program for Technology Management and Competitiveness supports pilot projects in
the field of technology management, executed by partnerships of firms and non-profit technical-
support entities provided that the projects have among their components: 1) the diagnosis of the
current technological situation of the particular industry; 2) the training of senior management in
the new concepts and instruments of technology management; and 3) the internal implementation
at the firm level of the structure and mechanisms of technology management that will enable
them to apply the concepts learned at the training stage.
In addition to these programs and the basic credit line to finance innovation, along the
lines described above, FINEP, the Brazilian federal innovation financial agency, has: a) an
“integral-support” credit line that finances all the aspects of a business plan for technological
innovation from the stage of project formulation all the way through the construction of civil
works; the purchase and installation of machinery, equipment and technical instruments; the
licensing and/or purchase of technology; to the training, technical assistance, and initial working
capital required; b) a pre-investment credit line to finance expenses associated to the payment of
engineering consulting services; and c) a credit line to support technology, environmental, and
quality-product management.
A.3 Fiscal Incentives
In the leading countries, as well as some others in the region, fiscal incentives to technology
innovation typically include: 1) reduction in the corporate income tax; 2) reduction in value-
added taxes; 3) accelerated depreciation of capital goods and equipment acquired in the context
of an innovation project; and 4) the granting of fiscal credits on expenses and additional
investments in research and development.  In addition to this basic set, some individual countries
grant special incentives. Colombia, for instance, allows a deduction of 125 percent of the costs of
                                                                                                                                                                                          
of a Ministry and its head that of a cabinet member.38
innovation projects and grants exemption from value-added taxes on imports of equipment and
instruments for innovation projects by research centers, technological development entities and
universities.  Brazil grants exemption from the Tax on Industrialized Products to firms producing
information technology products provided that the firm spends more than five percent of its gross
sales on research and development. It also allows the deduction as operational expenses of
payments of royalties and other technical assistance payments made by advanced-technology
firms.
A.4 Programs Directed to Specific Industries
Several countries in the region have special programs for the promotion of technological
innovation in sectors designated as strategic.  Perhaps the best illustration is the set of incentives
given by the Brazilian government to firms in the information technology sector.  These
incentives include, besides the above-mentioned exemption from the Tax on Industrialized
Products, a policy of government purchases of information technology goods based not only on
price considerations but also on the price-quality ratio of products offered in competitive bids by
information technology firms.  In addition, there is a program to support software production that
includes loans to companies involved in software development and buyers’ credit for their
commercial customers.
A.5 Horizontal Programs in Complementary Areas
This component of technology policies in the leading countries includes programs and
institutional efforts in the fields of product quality; product design; participation in, and/or
organization of, technical fairs and other events where technological innovations are
disseminated; organization of pools of technological consultants; promotion and defense of
industrial property; and the formal organization and completion of technology-foresight
exercises with implications for policy formulation and design.
3.3.3  Policies to Protect and Promote Competition
Most countries in the region assign an important role to the prevention, prosecution, and
elimination of restrictions on free competition in the domestic market and to the defense of their
producers and exporters against restrictive practices in the international trade arena.39
The leading countries passed new competition laws in the early-to-mid-1990s.  For the
most part, the new competition laws broadly resemble
84 the competition laws of the OECD
countries in that they proscribe anti-competitive conduct, including single-firm conduct by
monopolists or dominant firms, anti-competitive agreements, and anti-competitive mergers.  The
laws created independent agencies charged with the role of enforcing their provisions.
3.3.4 Fostering Private-Sector Investment in Human Capital
For the purposes of this survey it is of particular interest to illustrate some of the trends in Latin
American and Caribbean policymaking where the new understanding of the role of human
capital opened up by the theoretical work of Romer (1989) and others is materialized.  In some
specific policy measures the new approach seems to take shape in the form of explicit subsidies
or incentives to human capital investment by firms and households, beyond the general social
(and particularly governmental) effort to provide basic elementary, secondary, and general
professional university education.
We already mentioned one, perhaps paradigmatic, example of the way the new
approaches are taking root in the Region, namely, the modern treatment given by Chile’s
CORFO and El Salvador’s Banco Multilateral de Inversiones to individuals’ investment in
human capital in the form of university studies, an increasingly conscious and deliberate effort
towards designing active government policies of human capital formation seems to be a growing
trend in the region. This is expressed in policy actions ranging from more or less general
initiatives in helping individual firms to train or retrain their workers to sophisticated attempts to
strengthen the human capital stock in areas deemed strategic from the standpoint of the overall
economy’s modernization and increased competitiveness. Two experiences, Mexican policies on
human-resource development and a special Brazilian program aimed at training high-quality
personnel for strategic activities, will help to illustrate this point.
The incentive system developed by Mexico to encourage firms to train and/or retrain
their workers includes devices such as:
                                                          
84 In the case of the Mexican Law, an OECD expert pointed out that “(it) adopts many of the most advanced ideas
and practices from around the world.  (...) The law balances efficient and strong treatment of the most harmful
competitive constraints with economically sensitive analysis of others, and it implies an integrated treatment of
market power in all relevant situations.  The law’s elegant logical organization and clear conceptualisation reveal its
origin as a product of technical expertise, more than political creativity and compromise.”  See Wise (1999).40
1)  Scholarships from the Ministry of Labor to carry out in-house training of
prospective workers by firms for periods ranging up to three months, provided
that the beneficiary firm commit itself to hiring at least 70 percent of the
trainees;
2)  Training services provided by the Ministry of Education to workers and
employees of all levels, including the managerial level;
3)  Demand-driven courses
85 for the training of workers in the technical norms of
specific industries.
4)  Business training for the owners and managers of micro-, small-, and
medium- size enterprises, in issues of management, finance, accounting, and
investment projects, organized by the governmental development finance
corporation, NAFIN.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is worthwhile to mention Brazil’s Program for Human
Resource Training for Strategic Activities, an effort to train highly qualified professionals linked
to technological research, development of productive processes and technology management.
The program provides financial support to training projects in the following areas: 1) advanced
technologies (biotechnology, computer science, information technology, special materials); 2)
basic industrial technology (metrology, standardization, certification, industrial property,
technology management, quality and productivity programs); 3) technological innovation and
dissemination; 4) infrastructure-related technologies (energy, transportation,
telecommunications); and 5) environmental technologies.
3.4 Policies to Promote SME Development
Governments throughout the region recognize SMEs’ contributions to economic growth, social
cohesion, employment, and regional and local development.  It is also widely recognized that
trade liberalization and internal deregulation are pressuring firms of all sizes to improve their
competitive position. Unlike large firms, however, SMEs have a more limited internal resource
base and hence are at a disadvantage when it comes to devising effective responses to the new
challenges. By the same token, though, the opening of the economies and the greater degree of41
international economic integration bring new opportunities for SMEs to enter foreign markets
and take advantage of new technologies.  This section addresses the policy issues involved in
helping SMEs to face the challenges and opportunities stemming from the new situation.  The
section consists of two parts.  In the first, the main constraints faced by SMEs are briefly
surveyed.  In the second part, the main policy issues are discussed.  Unlike the other sections of
this paper, the present discussion is prescriptive.
3.4.1 Constraints Faced by SMEs
Drawing on the Bank’s strategy statement on SMEs,
86 the constraints faced by SMEs can be
classified into five groups, namely: 1) factor-market constraints; 2) final-product market
constraints; 3) regulatory constraints; 4) management constraints; and 5) institutional constraints.
Factor-market constraints include those associated with the operation of financial
markets, labor markets, markets for information and technology, and production-input markets.
In the typical country in the region, the supply of finance for working capital to SMEs is more
restricted than the supply to large enterprises.  The supply of long-term resources for the
financing of investment, either through debt or equity, is even more limited.  This is due, in part,
to the perception of greater risk, informational barriers, and the higher costs of intermediation for
smaller firms.
As for the other markets, SMEs frequently face limited supplies of skilled workers, have
difficulties in gaining access to appropriate technologies and to technical information, and in the
input acquisition front are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis large enterprises and foreign purchasers of
raw materials.
In domestic final-product markets, SMEs have limited access to public contracts and
suffer from the limitations stemming from the fact that distribution channels are controlled by
larger firms, and are frequently inefficient.  In the international final-product markets, they are
handicapped by their own limited experience in international marketing, poor quality control and
product standardization, and by limited access to international partners.
Deficiencies in the regulatory framework for private sector activities bear more heavily
on SMEs than on large firms.  It is in the nature of the case that, given the lower scale of
                                                                                                                                                                                          
85 The courses are demand-driven from the standpoint of the firms, that is to say, it is the firms (not the workers) that
determine the type of courses they need.
86 See Inter-American Development Bank (1995).42
operation and the smaller amounts of capital mobilized by SMEs, a whole set of regulatory
dispositions that impose fixed costs on firms create a proportionately greater burden on them.
Examples of these are licensing and registration requirements and other start-up costs as well as
indirect labor costs.
The scarcity of managerial talent, prevalent in most countries of the region, has a
magnified impact on SMEs.  Moreover, SMEs face particularly difficulties in the market for
consulting and other support services. In many instances these services are not price-accessible
to SMEs, and sometimes SME personnel do not even have information on these services’
existence.
When it comes to the institutional terrain, SMEs face two types of constraints.  First,
many individual SMEs are uninnovative; lack an entrepreneurial culture, and overlook
continuous training of, and lifelong learning in, their managers and workers.  Second, as an
economic sector in society at large, they lack cohesiveness and tend to have a limited capacity to
defend their collective interests vis-à-vis government and other social and economic groups.
3.4.2 Policies to Enhance SMEs Competitiveness
The strategic goal of helping SMEs raise their competitiveness requires that government policy
focus on two principal areas: reforming relevant aspects of the general policy, institutional, and
regulatory framework, with the aim of creating a level playing field; and ii) providing support
services to SMEs under the principle of compensating them for their unfavorable position.
The creation of a level playing field requires a careful examination, at the country level,
of the institutional, regulatory and policy framework to identify those particular aspects that
work as obstacles to SME development and growth or which in any way are biased against them.
These laws and regulations include those in the areas of business creation and incorporation,
taxes, tariffs, commercial law, and government procurement of goods and services.
In the area of support service provision, best-practice principles require moving away
from supply-driven schemes toward demand-driven initiatives, from emphasis on protection and
paternalism to competition, cost-recovery and sustainability.  Subsidized access to services
should not be ruled out but should be limited in scope, transparent in application and targeted to
identified need (IDB, no date).   The three main areas where provision of support services is
important are well known: 1) financial services; 2) access to technology; and 3) other business43
development services such as training, infrastructure, information, and non-financial support for
export activities.  What may be less known to some readers is that one of the emerging policy
trends in both developed and developing countries is the emphasis on support schemes where the
direct object of support is not the individual small or medium enterprise but various forms of
collective arrangements of SMEs.  These include a variety of partly overlapping policies (which,
moreover, are not limited to SMEs) such as: 1) policies to support the integration of production
chains; 2) policies to support clusters and 3) policies to support networks of enterprises.
87  Issues
of synergies created by interaction among enterprises and between groups of enterprises and the
surrounding social and economic environment, agglomeration economies, technological learning
through interaction, collective efficiency, network economies, and the like are topics that
increasingly play a prominent role both in the analytical literature and in practical policymaking.
In this connection, Casalet (1997) suggests that policy action aimed at groups of enterprises has a
higher probability of effect than action focused on individual entities.  We would venture to add
that the probability is also higher that the benefit function of such policies is a homogeneous
function of degree greater than one in the number of enterprises on the receiving end when these
are collective, as opposed to individual, objects of the policies.  In what follows, we first discuss
the provision of support services in the traditional format, that is to say, under the assumption
that the objects of the provision polices are individual enterprises, and thereafter we proceed to
discuss two modalities of collective SME service provision policies, namely, cluster promotion
and network promotion.
In the provision of financial services to SMEs, it is appropriate to develop credit
instruments specifically or predominantly geared to the needs of SMEs, and some countries in
the region already have valuable experience in that area.  The basic scheme of providing credit
lines through second-tier national development banks, leaving the interest rate to be freely
determined through negotiations between the first-tier, private bank and the loan beneficiary,
seems applicable to most countries in the region.  Subsidized lending distorts financial markets
and should be avoided.  The focus must be on medium- and long-term loans to finance purchases
of machinery, equipment, and services, and for plant expansion and modernization projects.  In
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categories.  Cluster and network promotion can be used as particular forms of strengthening production chains (but
there are other forms).  On the other hand, clusters could conceivably be seen as a particular type of network.44
this general mold, special credit lines for export-oriented SMEs are also necessary and can
contribute to enhance SMEs’ competitiveness.
Technological innovation by SMEs must be encouraged through 1) fiscal incentives, 2)
grants and credit provision and 3) technical assistance services.  In the area of grants and credit
provision, Brazil’s experience with the Technological Support Program for Micro- and Small-
Size Enterprises (PATME) and the SEBRAEtec
88 is worth assessing for possible replication in
other countries of the Region.  PATME finances technological innovation in the form of product
or process improvement, upgrading of equipment; training of human resources; implementation
or improvement of quality control; and development of new technologies and new products.
SEBRAetec provides grants that cover up to 80 percent of the costs of consulting services
received from private business and technical consultants, universities, technological research
institutes, and technical schools.
The importance of technical assistance services cannot be overstated.  SMEs need to
know where to find new technologies and how to adapt the new technologies to their particular
situation.  Technological advisory services are best provided by the private sector.  A way for the
government to stimulate both the demand and the supply in this market is through a voucher
system where the government would issue vouchers covering an appropriate percentage of
consulting costs, with the SMEs covering the remainder.
In the design of business development services (BDS) schemes, some lessons from past
experience must be taken into account.  An appropriate summary of these lessons can be found
in UNDP (1999).  First, BDS schemes must be demand-led, reflecting an analysis of genuine
need for the support service.  Second, they must be businesslike in that the end users must be
treated as customers rather than beneficiaries of handouts.  Third, the schemes must be
sustainable, which implies that cost recovery for services delivered must be actively pursued,
although some degree of subsidization may prove necessary.
Collective Service Provision: Supporting the Development of Clusters and Networks of SMEs
A cluster is an agglomeration of firms, in the same or related lines of business, in a given
geographical location.
89  In principle, a cluster can contain firms of all sizes in any combination,
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though some combinations are more frequent than others, and the number of enterprises can be
large or small.  The promotion of clusters of enterprises is an effective way by means of which
governments can create conditions for the private sector to enhance productivity, the rate if
innovation, and the competitive performance of firms. This is because the local concentration of
industries makes it possible for the participating firms to benefit from economies of scale,
economies of agglomeration and supply side externalities that would not otherwise be available
to the firms in isolation. Labor pooling, the availability of local input or equipment suppliers, and
shared infrastructure are just a few instances of such advantages.  More importantly, clusters are
optimal arrangements for the production and internal diffusion of tacit knowledge, the kind of
knowledge that gives a competitive edge to those who possess it.
90  In addition, in the case of
small firms, clusters can allow them to combine the advantages of small scale with some of the
benefits of large scale.
The question of an exhaustive and convincing typology of clusters has not been as yet
solved in the literature.  Mytelka and Farinelli (2000) make the distinction between clusters that
originate as spontaneous agglomerations of enterprises and those that are induced by public
policies.
91  For the spontaneous clusters they propose a three-pronged typology: informal clusters,
organized clusters, and innovative clusters.
92  Two groups of authors propose typologies that they
each contend are relevant to the Latin American and Caribbean situation.  Bortagaray and Tiffin
(2000) propose a five-category typology: dependent or truncated clusters; industrial clusters;
innovative industrial clusters; proto-innovation clusters; and mature-innovation clusters.
Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) identify three types of clusters: survival clusters; clusters of
more advanced and differentiated mass producers that flourished in the import-substitution era
                                                          
90 For a brief discussion of the concept of tacit knowledge, see Melo (2001).  For the importance of tacit knowledge
as the principal source of sustainable competitive advantage for an individual firm (or group of firms) in today’s
rapidly changing economy, see Winter (1987), Hall (1993), Grant (1996), Lam (1998).
91 Public-policy induced clusters include technopoles, industrial parks, incubators, and Export Processing Zones.
92 Just to mention the main characteristics of each category, informal clusters generally contain micro and small
firms whose technology level is low relative to the industry frontier and whose owner-operators have weak
management capabilities; organized clusters are characterized by a process of collective activity, mainly oriented
towards the provision of infrastructure and services and the development of organizational structures designed to
analyze and provide the channels to face common problems; although most firms in these clusters are small, some
have grown to medium size and their competence level has improved through training and apprenticeship; firms also
have the capacity to undertake technology adaptation , to design new products and to bring them quickly to the
market; innovative clusters are those that are able to maintain processes of sustained innovation  and have the
greatest potential for dynamic change.46
but are under enormous stress with the transition to open economies; and clusters of transnational
corporations that are showcases of best-practice manufacturing.
93   
A network is a group of firms using combined resources to cooperate on joint projects.
94
Networks can allow accelerated learning for the participating firms.  In the case of small firms,
they are conducive to peer-based learning, the learning medium of choice for many small firms.
They also can allow the sharing of overhead costs and the exploitation of specific scale
economies present in collective action.  Networks need not be geographically concentrated;  once
trust among participants is established, operational dialogue can be carried out through, for
example, electronic means.  However, networks frequently are key components of clusters,
particularly in the case of firms that belong to a production chain.
On the basis of their convoking power, governments can act as external catalysts to
facilitate the emergence of clusters and networks.  In doing so they will be addressing market
failures in the form of under-provision of public goods and co-ordination failures.
95
Various types of clusters exist in Latin America and the Caribbean.  While no doubt
many of them should appropriately be classified as belonging to the less innovative categories
(informal clusters in the sense defined by Mytelka and Farinelli and/or survival clusters in the
sense of Altenburg’ and Meyer Stamer’s typology), quite a few reach the innovative-industrial
and proto-innovation categories proposed in Bortagaray and Tiffin’s very demanding typology.
It is noteworthy that some of the clusters these authors studied are in high-technology industries
such as microelectronics (Campinas), telecommunications (Campinas, Curitiba), computer
science and infomatics (Campinas, Sao Leopoldo, Monterrey) software (Curitiba, Espírito Santo,
Porto Real, Porto Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, San José); automation engineering (Espírito Santo);
biotechnology (Belo Horizonte, La Habana); electronics (Santa Rita de Sapucaí, Cuernavaca,
Guadalajara); and aeronautics (Sao José dos Campos).
The policy of promoting clusters is by no means new in the Region.  Cluster initiatives
have been undertaken in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  There is already a rich stock of
                                                          
93 However, the assumption underlying this classification that only clusters revolving around transnational
corporations are dynamic clusters seem to be contradicted by Bortagaray’s and Tiffin’s findings.  The latter authors
make reference to a number of dynamic clusters (which they happen to classify all as proto-innovation clusters)
which are not centered on transnational companies.
94 For discussion on networks we draw from Enright and Ffowcs-Williams (2000).
95 See on this, Enright and Ffowcs-Williams (2000, p. 13).47
experience that space constraints prevent us from examining in detail.
96  Instead, the discussion
proceeds to tackle policy principles, policy lessons and best practice issues in cluster promotion.
To begin with policy principles, the most important is the principle that the focus of
cluster promotion policies must be to help small- and medium-size enterprises.  In other words,
promotion of clusters must be one of the centerpieces of policies to promote the development
and upgrading of small- and medium-size enterprises.  That the objects of promotion must be the
SMEs does not imply that only clusters of SMEs should be promoted.  It is perfectly appropriate
for public policy to support clusters where, alongside SMEs, large enterprises participate and
even have a leading role (as will most likely be the case).  The point is that whatever incentives
or subsidies are granted (beyond public good provision), they must be focused on the
participating SMEs.
97  A second policy principle is that government must play an indirect role in
cluster building.
98  The basis for this principle lies in the compelling consideration that it is very
difficult for governments to create the system of linkages among companies, between industries,
and between firms and supporting institutions on which cluster success critically depends.  This
means that the private sector must lead cluster-building initiatives and the government must play
the role of catalyst.  It must help the potential cluster members to overcome specific constraints
that prevent the exploitation of inter-firm and firm-institution linkages, and to support the
institutions that build skills and capabilities tailored to the needs of the cluster. A third policy
principle is that SME cluster policies (and all SME policies for that matter) should be based on
building consensus through dialogue and negotiation processes involving firms and workers.
99
Some lessons from the experiences in the region and in other parts of the world may help
illuminate cluster support policies.  Drawing from Enright and Ffowcs-Williams (2000), and
Schmitz (2000), inter alia, the following policy guidelines can be recommended: 1) that
policymakers should refrain from seeking to build clusters in industrial sectors that happen to be
entirely new for a country. There should be some element of market-test and a critical mass of
enterprises and skills before significant public resources are committed to a cluster.  Successful
clusters cannot be created from scratch.   The focus should be on consolidation of established or
                                                          
96 For some experiences in cluster promotion in Latin America and the Caribbean, see Aragón (no date), Bortagary
and Tiffin (2000), Ceglie and Dini (1999), Farinelli and Kluzer (1998), and Nadvi (1995).
97 It is, of course, perfectly appropriate for public policy to provide public goods to large enterprises.  They must be
provided to all enterprises independently of their size.
98 On this point, we draw heavily from Enright and Ffowcs-Williams (2000).
99 Farinelli and Kluzer (no date) emphasize this principle.48
embryonic clusters.  In their view “cluster initiatives should not be used to introduce
distortionary industrial policies aimed at targeting ‘national champions’ or ‘sunrise sectors’”(p.
24, italics are theirs).  External support for clusters works best where industrial policy is
decentralized and builds on public-private partnership.   3) The focus of public policy must be in
building the institutional and support systems for the cluster.  This includes building capacity in
industry associations, labor groups, financial institutions, research centers, universities and
schools, technical extension services, and the relevant government agencies.
4.  Toward an Assessment of the Emerging Policies: The Case of Export
Promotion
As stated in the introduction, it is too early to pass judgement on the emerging set of industrial
policies in the region.  However, as also indicated, a first approximation, however tentative, to an
assessment of the policies in the area of export promotion can be attempted.  This will be made
through recourse to two sources of testimony, namely the business people who are the policies’
putative beneficiaries and some of the leading professional experts on this issue in the region.
This part of the paper then consists of two sections.  In the first section, the results of a business
opinion survey will be used to gauge how entrepreneurs assess export promotion policies in four
of the leading countries.  In the second, we review what seems to be the overall assessment about
the current state of export promotion policies in the region as a whole by one of the most
qualified group of experts on the subject.
4.1 Promotion Policies in Four Selected Countries
In the mid-1990s, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) conducted case studies on the experience of successful exporters in four
countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico).
100  The purpose was “to learn from the
companies that are successful exporters” and to assess the effectiveness of export promotion
policies from the standpoint of their final users.
101  The ECLAC researchers surveyed business
people’s opinions on such matters as the main factors that push a firm to start exporting; whether
                                                          
100 The studies were carried out (in 1995-1996) in the context of ECLAC’s Regional Project on Policies to Promote
Innovation and Competitiveness in the Latin American and Caribbean Business Sector.  The results of this research
can be found in Macario (1998a), Macario (1998b), Macario (1998c), and Macario et al. (2000).
101 Macario et al. (2000, pp. 3-4).49
there is a learning process involved in exporting; whether the particular firm used any export
promotion instrument; how the firm evaluated any instrument used; the main obstacles to
exporting; and other related issues.
To begin with the Brazilian survey, it is interesting to note that, in the main, the Brazilian
exporters seem not to have spoken at length on the several export promotion policy instruments
individually considered, let alone on the coherence and efficacy of the set of export promotion
policies as a whole.
102  One is hard pressed to find in Bonelli’s (2000) account of the research
results explicit opinions on particular policy instruments.  Exporters in the car parts industry
stated that they make little use of the drawback mechanism because of its complexity, and
exporters in the pulp and paper industry pointed out that the mechanism is not particularly
relevant to their sector as they import few inputs. They also said that the elimination of the state-
level merchandise and services sales tax (ICMS) was a boost to exports.  Exporters in the textile
sector, on the other hand, were of the opinion that “financing arrangements are a potential source
of competitiveness.”
103  On this matter, exporters in all sectors surveyed were unanimous in their
criticism concerning the lack of financing whose terms, amounts and maturities were on a par
with those enjoyed by competing imports.  According to Bonelli, none of the firms surveyed
accorded any importance to the forms of financing offered by the BNDES.  None of the firms in
the machinery and equipment industry found useful BNDES’ credit line for capital goods
(FINAMEX) useful.  Those surveyed also noted the lack of an authentic export-import bank.
A recurrent theme in the Brazilian survey was the complaint of too much government
interference and red tape associated with exporting.  There was frequent criticism about the
excessive number forms required and about excessive regulation.
104  The proliferation of
government bodies involved with exports (and attached, moreover, to different ministries) was
seen as an obstacle to an effective export policy.  The complexity of the tax system was also
mentioned as an obstacle.  Those surveyed said that the business promotion policies of the
                                                          
102 The only exception seems to be a statement by exporters in the pulp and paper industry as to their belief that the
“lack of a specific export policy at the federal level is a barrier to exports.”  See Bonelli (2000, p. 103).
103 It is implicit in Bonelli (2000, p. 101) and must be pointed out explicitly here that, despite the appearances, the
Brazilian exporters in question were not praising  the Brazilian system of export credit.  They just were just stating a
lesson learned, as it were, from their competitors.  They mainly had in mind the fact that textile imports into Brazil
are supported by foreign-government supplier credit provided under “extremely favorable terms.”
104 For two firms in the machinery and equipment sector, one area where they learned major lessons in the process of
exporting was that of how to deal with the bureaucracy.50
individual Brazilian states had much more to do with attracting firms to the respective regions
than with providing support and incentives to exports.
Bonelli’s own assessment was that, given the macroeconomic constraints imposed by the
then-appreciating exchange rate, the most feasible way of expanding exports lay in the area of
credit.  He pointed out that the main difficulties in this area are that: 1) the task of supplying
credit is split among a number of government agencies; 2) there was uncertainty about the
allocation of budgetary resources for the interest-rate equalization program; 3) the rules
governing private-sector operations were not entirely stable; and 4) export credit insurance had
never functioned satisfactorily.  Bonelli also notes the sizeable amount of resources required for
an export credit scheme to be successful in a country the size of Brazil. As fiscal adjustment has
been a major challenge for Brazilian macroeconomic policy over the years, he adds that turning
to overseas sources of funds may prove an interim solution while the fiscal adjustment works its
way through and domestic interest rates decline.
Chilean exporters stated that their country’s export promotion system is effective in
providing support: information is readily available and export formalities are transparent,
streamlined, and expeditious.
105  The instrument most often used by firms in the survey was the
Simplified Drawback, and most of the firms had received assistance from the non-financial
export promotion agency, Pro-Chile, particularly when taking the first steps at exporting.
Nevertheless, the firms were not as optimistic about the effectiveness of export promotion
policies in the future.  They were concerned that the elimination of the Simplified Drawback and
of the scheme that allows tariff reductions on imports of equipment would make it more difficult
for them to export.
Macario claims that the Chilean policies of that time are “past their peak”
106 and that new
policies are needed for the country to go back to the high export growth rates of the late 1980s
and early 1990s.  This need will be compounded by the fact that the current instruments will
become less effective once the export subsidies are phased out to comply with WTO rules.
107
Macario thus implies that the key to a new export promotion system lies in policies to upgrade
productivity.  If these policies are horizontal, that is to say, if they are not aimed only at the
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106 Macario et al. (2000, p.67).
107 This has to do with the fact that an important share of the medium-size firms exporting goods other than
commodities are heavily dependent on the Simplified Drawback mechanism.51
exporters but at all firms regardless of  whether their production is oriented to the domestic or the
external market, such policies have the additional advantage of being compatible with WTO
rules.
According to Macario et al. (2000), interviews with Colombian exporters “showed that
Colombia has a quite efficient export promotion system when seen from the perspective of
individual companies.”
108  Credit from Bancoldex was the export promotion device most
frequently used by the exporters in the sample.
109  In addition to its availability, financing
provided by Bancoldex has two advantages.  First, interest rates (though no longer subsidized)
are generally lower than those offered on the domestic market.  Second, the loans are available
for longer periods than commercial bank loans.
110
From the standpoint of the exporters surveyed, the second most important export
promotion instrument was the drawback mechanism popularly known in Colombia as “Plan
Vallejo.” Most corporate managers said that it would be very difficult to export without the
assistance provided by this scheme (which, as mentioned above, is not compatible with WTO
rules).  The Tax Refund Certificates schem ranks third, in the business executives’ view, among
promotion instruments.  However, there were complaints about the frequent changes in the
amount to be credited to the exporter. In any case, this instrument must also be phased out to
comply with WTO rules.
In contrast to their positive opinion of export promotion institutions, entrepreneurs felt
that the other government agencies “do all they can to hinder productivity and export growth”
and singled out the customs agency as the most significant obstacle in the institutional sphere.
Macario’s own assessment of Colombia’s export promotion system at that time was that,
although the country had, for decades, “exemplary export promotion policies,”
111 there is a need
to bring up to date the policies required for export assistance.  She proposes that reforms must be
undertaken along the lines of allowing firms both to have access to competitively priced inputs
and to avoid that their goods pay taxes twice, that is, in Colombia and in the country of
destination.  Accordingly, she suggests adoption of a streamlined drawback scheme and an
                                                          
108 See Macario (2000, pp. 127-128).  She adds that “[E]ighteen of the twenty-one firms included in the survey make
use of the export promotion instruments, which was to be expected since the country is a pioneer in this field.”
109 In Macario’s view, Colombian companies have better access to export financing than those in most other Latin
American countries.
110 Macario et al. (2000, p. 128).
111 Macario et al. (2000, p. 133).52
exemption from duties for inputs imported to manufacture exports.  She recommends Mexico’s
ALTEX scheme (see above) as a model to set up, in a first stage, a duty exemption system for
firms that have a long-standing export record. In a second stage, the system would be extended to
the remaining firms.
According to ten Kate et al.’s (2000) summary of Mexican exporters’ views, Mexico’s
export promotion programs are very useful for export firms. Companies make extensive use of
the instruments available to them, such as the temporary admission scheme, the drawback
scheme for high-volume exporters (the ALTEX program), and Bancomext assistance through
credit and information provision.  For those authors, “the government’s ability to set up
programs that allow companies to have ready access to a wide range of inputs and to streamline
bureaucratic export formalities is outstanding and sets it apart form its counterparts within the
region.”
112  Moreover, they add, Mexican export promotion programs have the additional
advantage of being fully compatible with WTO rules.  They also believe that, although there is
room for improvement, Bancomext is “an exemplary institution.”  Its programs play a
particularly crucial role in the individual firms’ initial stages of export activity when companies
in need of information on how to access foreign markets obtain Bancomext financing for
participation in trade fairs and similar information-gathering pursuits.
The authors also praise the Mexican export promotion agencies’ administrative capability
and attribute it to the high professional level of their human resources.  In short, the authors
believe that, while Mexico’s export success is mainly the result of a wide range of economic
policies, the size of the country’s manufacturing sector, its proximity to the United States, and its
export promotion system also makes a valuable contribution.
4.2 The Experts’ Testimony: Elements for an Assessment of Export Promotion Policies in
the Region as a Whole
Macario et al. (2000) and related works
113 express a shared view about industrial policy issues
and, in particular, about export promotion policies. Given the authors’ institutional ties with
ECLAC, it does not seem unreasonable to refer their common perspective as the ECLAC view.
Since, moreover, this view represents the thinking of one of the most qualified and
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knowledgeable groups of experts on these matters in the region, it is instructive to review their
assessment of the current state of export promotion policies.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the final chapter of Macario et al. (2000) is
that export promotion systems in Latin America and the Caribbean are insufficient and need to
be improved.  The elements to support that diagnosis can be found throughout the chapter.  As
the chapter emphasizes, though, it is necessary to deduce the diagnosis’ parts and components
from the policy recommendations.
The implicit diagnosis is as follows.  First, drawback mechanisms in most countries in the
region are deficient in that their use by exporters requires complex, inefficient, and time-
consuming procedures.  In some cases, the situation is compounded by lack of transparency, and
in others the mechanism is not permanent.  Some countries try to solve short-term public-sector
budget problems by diverting to other uses resources originally allocated to the drawback.  In
still other countries, the mechanism is more of an export subsidy than a rebate on tariffs, and
therefore incompatible with WTO rules.  Most countries are also lagging behind in two key areas
having to do with the instrument’s basic design, namely: a) making the mechanism accessible to
indirect exporters; and, even more importantly, b) replacing it (at the very least for frequent
exporters) with an outright duty exemption scheme.   The first innovation consists of allowing
domestic companies that supply inputs to exporters to get a rebate for the duties paid when
importing goods used in the production of those inputs.   As explained in a previous section of
this paper, the second innovation allows exporting firms to decrease the funds needed for
working capital vis-a-vis the scenario in which they use the traditional reimbursement scheme.
Second, some Latin American countries provide export firms with direct export
financing. On the other hand, several countries that fail to provide financing for export
companies.  But even among the subset of those that provide export-oriented financing there are
some where the resources allocated for the purpose are insignificant and go mainly to a few large
firms, which makes the impact of export financing on export growth negligible.  While some
countries have credit lines for foreign buyers of their exports, others do not, thus putting their
exporters at a disadvantage.   In a number of countries, long-term financing for fixed investment
in export activities is all but non-existent.  Last but not least, smaller and medium-size firms
often have limited access to finance because of their inability to provide adequate collateral.54
In the area of credit insurance, two types of risk are relevant, namely commercial risk and
political risk.   Credit insurance against commercial risk is provided by a number of countries,
but still there are some that do not provide this service to their exporters. Political risk insurance,
moreover, is still lacking in most countries.
Third, many countries in the region still require exporters to comply with too many
regulations, which discourage exporters, particularly first-timers.  While many of these
formalities were originally set up to deal with short-term contingencies during the period of
import substitution, they remain in place long after both those contingencies and the import
substitution model itself became a thing of  the past.
114    
On the basis of this diagnosis, Macario contends that the export promotion instruments
currently used by the region’s governments are generally insufficient for sustained growth (or
even a sustained level) of exports of highly value added goods.  In Macario’s view the only
exceptions are Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Barbados and Brazil.  In her view most countries
will have to reform their export promotion policies to make them more effective in light of the
new challenges faced by export firms. She goes on to propose a set of policy guidelines to
improve the Latin American and Caribbean national systems of export promotion.  According to
her, the first step that must be taken to reduce anti-export bias is to cut tariff rates as much
possible within a range consistent with the other priorities of economic policy.  Other areas in
which reforms are urgent and important include emphasizing productivity-enhancing policies;
improving the instruments to allow access to competitive inputs, by introducing improved
drawback mechanisms (including duty rebates for indirect exporters and outright duty exemption
schemes); resolving the existing constraints and limitations in the area of export financing;
upgrading the market information services provided by export promotion agencies; and
streamlining the administrative procedures and formalities involved in exporting.
                                                          
114 Macario notes that some Caribbean countries require a specific sanitary permit and an authorization by the
Ministry of Defense for every single export shipment.  Exporting then can require up to ten different steps. Some of
these steps entail going to offices in different locations and submitting copies of the forms already presented in
another office.55
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